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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the above-entitled matter pursuant 
to § 78-2-2 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) as amended and by transfer from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 3 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the vocational training program 
administered by the Division of Correctional Industries as a profit oriented business 
conducted outside of prison facilities enjoys governmental immunity because it was a) a 
governmental function and b) the injuries "arose out o f or occurred "in connection" with 
John Richards' incarceration at the Utah State Prison? 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that John Richards may not bring an action 
against the State of Utah for violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that John Richards Complaint failed to state a 
claim for damages for a violation of Article I, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution. 
Each of the issues presented for review is to be decided under the following Standard 
of Review. When reviewing a judgment entered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. 
Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). Additionally, a motion 
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to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will be affirmed only if it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proven in support of its claims. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
Also, when reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling 
should only be affirmed if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of its claim. Colman v. Utah State Land B(L 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). The trial 
court should receive no deference as a Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dismissal 
is a question of law, and reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act 
63-30-10, UTAHCODFANN. Waiver ofimmunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee ~ Exceptions. - Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: . . . 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other 
place of legal confinement; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves a serious permanent injury suffered by John Richards while 
participating in a vocational training program administered by Utah Correctional Industries. 
John Richards was an inmate at Utah State Prison in its minimum security facility in 
Bluffdale, Utah. Mr. Richards participated in a work release program providing vocational 
training and administered by Utah Correctional Industries. Utah Correctional Industries is 
a for profit division of the Utah State Department of Corrections organized under the 
authority of the Utah Correctional Industries Act § 64-13 a-1 et seq. 
Pursuant to § 63-13a-2, the Utah State Legislature created a Division of Correctional 
Industries as a profit oriented organization designed to generate revenue for its operations 
and capital investment and assuming responsibility for training offenders in general work 
habits, work skills, and specific training skills that increase their employment prospects when 
released and provide an environment for the operation of a correctional industries that closely 
resembles the environment for the business operations of a private corporate entity. 
At the time of his injury, Mr. Richards was participating in the Utah Correctional 
Industries program at Waste Management of Utah's facility in West Jordan. The program 
participants were unsupervised and untrained in the operation of heavy equipment and 
machinery. While at Waste Management's facility, Mr. Richards sustained a serious injury 
when a forklift driven by an unlicenced, untrained inmate overturned onto his leg resulting 
in the amputation of one foot and serious injury to his other foot. 
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John Richards brought suit against the Waste Management of Utah and against Utah 
Correctional Industries, a division of the State of Utah Department of Corrections alleging 
negligence claims against the Division of Correctional Industries, and claims for violation 
of his Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and under Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution. The State of Utah Department of Corrections, 
Division of Correctional Industries filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of John 
Richards against it. The trial court Judge L.A. Dever granted the State of Utah's Motion to 
Dismiss without a Memorandum Decision dismissing Count I and Count III of John 
Richards' Complaint against the State of Utah Department of Corrections Division of 
Correctional Industries and certifying that the dismissal of the Complaint was a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on November 6, 2001. 
Plaintiff, John Richards, appealed the dismissal of his Complaint against the State of Utah 
Department of Corrections Division of Correctional Industries on December 5, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of determining the correctness of the trial court's decision in this matter, 
the following facts must be accepted as true as alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint. 
1. John Richards was an inmate of the Utah Department of Corrections at the 
Utah State Prison under the care, custody, and subject to the supervision of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections. (R.3). 
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2. On July 17, 2000, John Richards was engaged in a training program 
administered by the Division of Correctional Industries at a private facility owned and 
operated by Waste Management located at 8652 South 4000 West, West Jordan, Utah. (R.3). 
3. The Division of Correctional Industries allowed inmates participating in the 
vocational training to operate equipment, including a forklift, without appropriate training, 
certification, or any supervision. A forklift, being operated by a fellow inmate of the 
Department of Corrections, overturned onto Plaintiff, John Richards. (R.3). 
4. As a result of injuries received by the overturned forklift, John Richards has 
serious and permanent injuries to his legs, including the subsequent amputation of his left 
foot. (R.3). 
5. The Utah State Department of Corrections Division of Correctional Industries 
knew or had reason to know that the inmates participating in the vocational training program 
were not properly trained or certified to operate forklifts. Utah Correctional Industries failed 
to properly train and supervise the inmates during their training program or require them to 
receive proper training and certification in the use of forklifts, which created a dangerous 
work environment. (R.4). 
6. The Utah State Department of Corrections, Division of Correctional Industries 
failed to warn John Richards about the dangerous conditions that were created by the lack 
of any supervision, training, or certification of the inmates participating in the program. John 
Richards had a legitimate expectation that if you participated in the vocational training 
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program for the Division of Correctional Industries, that they would create a safe and suitable 
training environment. The Division of Correctional Industries and Department of Correction 
failed to implement and provide appropriate and adequate training to inmates in the operation 
of the forklift and failed to require proper certification of the inmates before they operated 
theforklift. (R.3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah correctional Industries does not perform a core governmental function and 
therefore does not enjoy governmental immunity. Rather, Utah Correctional Industries is a 
proprietary vocational training program organized to generate profits. It does not perform 
a function essential to government not doe sit provide a service that only the State may 
provide. 
Even if Utah Correctional Industries performs a core governmental function, 
immunity for John Richards' injuries has been waived § 63-30-10 UTAH CODE ANN. waives 
immunity for the negligent acts or omissions of an employee of a governmental entity. While 
John Richards was still completing his sentence at the Utah State Prison minimum security 
facility at the time he was injured, his injuries did "arise out o f or "in connection with" any 
incarceration in the prison. 
John Richards was injured while working at Waste Management, a private business 
located in West Jordan, Utah. He was not confined or incarcerated at the time of his injury. 
Mr. Richards' injury did not arise out of the operation of the prison or is it connected to the 
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operation of the prison. Mr. Richards was unsupervised, unrestricted, and untrained while 
participating in an off-site vocational training program of Utah Correctional Industries. 
Therefore, no exception to the waiver of immunity applies to Utah Correctional Industries' 
activities in this case. 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution protect John Richards from cruel and unusual punishment, including 
the deliberate indifference to the health and safety of prison inmates. By knowingly placing 
John Richards in a dangerous work environment with untrained, unqualified, and 
unsupervised inmates operating dangerous heavy equipment, Utah Correctional Industries 
violated the constitutional protections guaranteed Mr. Richards. As a result, Mr. Richards 
suffered serious permanent injuries. 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I. Section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution are self-executing provisions that do not require separate enabling 
legislation to bring a claim for damages resulting from the violation. If the Court dismisses 
Mr. Richards' other claims against Utah Correctional Industries, he has no other available 
remedy and is therefore entitled to bring his damage claims for violation of his constitutional 
rights. The trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Richards' Complaint against Utah Correctional 
Industries. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Complaint contains three causes of action; (1) negligence against the Utah 
Correctional Industries; (2) negligence against Waste Management of Utah; and (3) 
constitutional violations against Utah Correctional Industries under the Eighth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. The 
Defendant, State of Utah Department of Correction Division of Correctional Industries, filed 
its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the first and 
the third claims, alleging that the Complaint of John Richards failed to state a claim against 
the Division of Correctional Industries. The trial court erred in dismissing John Richards' 
Complaint against the Division of Correctional Industries. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Utah Correctional Industries does not enjoy any immunity from suit under Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-3 UTAH CODE ANN. specifically provides "(1) 
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, . . ." 
(Emphasis added). Utah Courts have consistently held that when a governmental agency 
engages in a non-governmental function or "non-core" governmental function, it does not 
enjoy immunity. 
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A. Utah Correctional Industries Does Not Engage in a Governmental 
Function and Therefore Does Not Enjoy Immunity. 
In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test for determining if a 
governmental activity enjoys governmental immunity in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). The Standiford court identified a distinction between a core 
governmental function and a non-core governmental function. If a governmental activity is 
of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency, or if it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity, it is a core governmental activity and immunity 
normally applies. However, if it is not a core governmental activity, the state will not enjoy 
immunity in that activity. 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-1237 (Utah 1980). The activity in question 
in this case is not a core governmental function. In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 
P.2d 432 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court explained this further stating: 
The first part of the Standiford test - activity of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency — does not refer to what 
government may do, but rather to what government alone must do. . . . [T]he 
second part of the Standiford test - essential to the core of governmental 
activity — which refers to those activities not unique in themselves but 
essential to the performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental. 
629P.2d4325434. 
Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993) also recognized 
the necessity of finding the existence of a core governmental function before a claim of 
immunity is justified. Ledfors' first requirement in a three step analysis to determine if the 
government is entitled to immunity, asked "was the activity the entity performed a 
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governmental function and therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity 
contained in § 63-30-3?" 849 P.2d at 1166 (Utah 1993). The Court recognized in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), that the Utah Constitution 
imposes limits on a legislature's authority to immunize all governmental actions from suit. 
That immunity is limited to a governmental function. The Supreme Court reiterated the 
limitation on governmental immunity in Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). The Court 
recognized that the threshold question in determining whether there is governmental 
immunity pursuant to § 63-30-3(1) is to determine whether the activity is a "governmental 
function." If the activity is a proprietary or a non-essential governmental function, then the 
Constitution prevents that immunity from applying. 
The first step in the analysis then is to determine if the Division of Correctional 
Industries performs an activity of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency. The second part of the Standiford test is to determine whether the 
activity is essential to a core governmental activity. The Division of Correctional Industries 
fails on both prongs of the test. 
The Division of Correctional Industries' enabling statute states: 
It is the intent of the Legislature in this chapter to: 
(1) create a Division of Correctional Industries which: 
(a) is a self supported organization; 
(b) is profit-oriented; 
(c) generates revenue for its operations and capital investment; 
and 
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(d) assumes responsibility for training offenders in general work 
habits, work skills, and specific training skills that increase their 
employment prospects when released; 
(2) provide an environment for the operation of correctional industries 
that closely resembles the environment for the business operations of a private 
corporate entity; 
(3) make the Division of Correctional Industries responsible for and 
accountable to the Legislature and to the governor for correctional industries 
programs in this state. 
§64-13a-2 UTAH CODE ANN. 
It is clear that the Division of Correctional Industries did not act in a core 
governmental function. Its motive is expressly stated as "for profit." Its work is not work 
that the "government alone must do," nor is the training program, essential to a core 
governmental activity. Stepping into the private sector to provide inmates at the Utah State 
Prison vocational training is not a core governmental function. It is also not an activity that 
"government alone must do/' While operation of a prison may be a core governmental 
activity, the training of inmates in "general work habits, work skills and specific training 
skills" is not essential to the operation of the prison. The Division of Correctional Industries' 
training program, therefore, completely fails to meet the requirements for immunity set forth 
by Standiford and Johnson. Because of this, the State, in this non-core governmental activity, 
is not entitled to immunity. In addition, the language of the enabling statute requires that the 
Division of Correctional Industries' operation "closely resemble[] the environment for the 
business operations of a private corporate entity," which includes responsibility for injuries 
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due to improper conditions, improper procedure, improper administration, failure to 
adequately train and supervise, or any other form of negligence. 
Other factors, which the courts have identified to use in determining if the activity is 
a core governmental function, include the mandatory nature of the government activity. 
Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). Certainly, it is not mandatory that the 
government compete in the market as a for-profit vocational training agency. A second 
factor is whether the activity can be performed by an entity other than the government. If it 
can, and such training services certainly can, then the activity is not an essential 
governmental function entitled to immunity. Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 
832, 839 (Utah 1992) (J. Stewart dissent). Associated with these considerations is the 
principle that government, in its proprietary activities, is not protected by immunity. "Where 
a public body, which w ould otherwise be entitled to sovereign immunity, engages in activity 
of a commercial or proprietary character, the protection does not exist." Nestman v. South 
Davis Water Imp. Dist, 398 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1965). The enabling legislation for Utah 
Correctional Industries makes it clear it is simply a commercial enterprise of the State of 
Utah providing a non-essential, proprietary function not entitled to immunity. 
B. The Plaintiffs injury did not "arise out o f or occur "in connection with" 
the Plaintiffs incarceration at the Utah State Prison. 
Utah Correctional Industries claims immunity under § 63-30-10(10) UTAH CODE 
ANN., which makes inapplicable a waiver of immunity for a negligent act or omission of an 
employee "if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: (10) the 
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incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement." 
Contrary to the Defendant's contentions, simply because a person is confined at night 
in a minimum security facility, every event that occurs while serving his sentence does not 
"arise out o f or is necessarily "connected with" his incarceration. The terms "arise out o f 
and "in connection with," are not without limits. The injury of Mr. Richards does not "arise 
out o f or "in connection with" Mr. Richards' incarceration. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Taylor v. Ogden School DisU 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), 
had an opportunity to interpret the use of the words "arising out o f in a similar exception 
to the waiver of immunity where the injury "arises out of assault." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
30-10(l)(b). The court in Taylor acknowledged that the words "arises out of" import a 
concept of causation. Citing to National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. 
Western Casualty and Surety Co., 557 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) 
The words "arising out o f are very broad, general and comprehensive. They 
are commonly understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or 
flowing from, and required only that there be some causal relationship between 
the injury and the risk [provided for]. 
557P.2dat963. 
In other words, the court stated the injuries must have originated from, grown out of, 
or flowed from the assault. 
Likewise, in this case, Mr. Richards' injuries must have originated from, grown out 
of, or flowed from his incarceration. While Mr. Richards was still fulfilling his sentence 
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with the Utah State Prison at the time of the incident, his injuries did not arise from, grow out 
of, flow from, or have any causal connection with any "incarceration" as identified in Utah's 
exception to waiver of immunity. Webster's dictionary defines "incarcerate" as to imprison, 
to confine in jail, to shut up, or enclose. Mr. Richards injury occurred while he was off the 
premises of Utah Department of Corrections, while he was "at large" without supervision or 
restraint. He was engaging in a vocational training program administered by Utah 
Correctional Industries a "for profit" division of the State of Utah. Those activities are 
neither an "incarceration" nor do they arise out of or in connection with his "incarceration." 
Injuries resulting from a fight with another prisoner in prison, injuries occurring in the 
prison hospital, and injuries resulting from any activity or condition necessary or inherent in 
the administration, security, or confinement in the Utah State Prison facility would originate, 
grow out of, or flow from the incarceration, and have been so recognized by die courts. See 
Sheffield; Madsenv. State, 583 P.2d92 0Jtah 1978); Schmittv. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1979); Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987); Ross v. Schackel 920 P.2d 
1159 (Utah 1996). The circumstances resulting in the injuries, in this case, however, are 
materially different and easily distinguished from the circumstances above. Mr. Richards' 
injuries did not occur because of the incarceration or because of anything connected with, 
or to be expected from the administration of a prison, or incarceration of individuals within 
the prison. The injuries in this case occurred during an unsupervised training program, off 
prison grounds, at a private firm's warehouse. 
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Section 64-90-1, UTAH CODE ANN., sets out a program by which the Department of 
Corrections can develop job opportunities to enhance rehabilitation of inmates at the Utah 
State Prison. Those legislative provisions provide for the creation of work programs within 
the prison facility for the purpose of creating job opportunities for inmates within a secure 
correctional facility. In addition, § 64-13-1, UTAH CODE ANN., defines a correctional facility 
to mean any facility operated to house offenders, either in a secure or non-secure setting and 
further provides the definition of a secure correctional facility as "secure correctional facility 
means any prison, penitentiary, or other institution operated by the department or under 
contract for the confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they 
attempt to leave the institution without the authorization." Section 64-13-1(9) (emphasis 
added). Section 64-13-14 UTAH CODE ANN., goes on to provide that "the department [of 
corrections] shall maintain and operate secure correctional facilities for the incarceration of 
offenders." If Mr. Richards' injuries had occurred at the prison facility while engaged on a 
work program administered by the Utah Department of Corrections under § 64-9b-l et seq. 
UTAH CODE ANN. or while working at a secure correctional facility for the incarceration of 
offenders, then the exception to waiver of immunity may apply. None of those circumstances 
occurred in this case. 
Mr. Richards was injured while participating in an off-site, unsupervised training 
program operated pursuant to § 64-13a-1 et seq., the Utah Correctional Industries Act. Any 
relationship of Mr. Richards' injury to his "incarceration" within any facility for the 
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confinement of pnsoneis in the State of Utah is so remote as to not be the cause of his injury 
Rather, the injury in this case arises out of Mr Richards' work perfoimed at Waste 
Management and the operation of a forkhft by an untrained and unsupervised operator of the 
forkhft Mi Richards was neithei confined nor incarcerated at the time of his injury He 
was, in fact, unsupervised and essentially at large within the communit) Theiefore, the 
exception to the immunity foi negligence of an employee ot the State of Utah has been 
waived for Mr Richards' injury 
Utah Conectional Industries claims this case is akin to Sheffield v Turner, 455 P 2d 
367 (Utah 1968), where a prisoner was injured at the hands of other pnsoneis, but had his 
negligence claim against the State denied because of immunity Utah Conectional Industries 
fails to acknowledge, howevei, that the injury that occuired in Sheffield aiose directly from 
his incaiceiation In Sheffield, the fight occuiied at the prison and the allegations of 
negligence concerned a challenge to the methods of "incarceration" and the seem lty provided 
within the prison facility In om case, however, the danger to Mr Richards was, m fact, 
created by the acts and omissions of the Utah Correctional Industries for the off-site work 
program by allowing heavy machinery to be used by the participants and allowing other 
participants to work in the vicinity of the heavy machinery without any training or 
supervision The administrators knew or should have known that this could lead to serious 
injury or the death of those involved, but nevertheless, allowed the conditions to continue 
The injury to Mr Richards did not arise out of the incarceration, but rather, because the 
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administrators of the off-site work program created a dangerous situation, and then placed 
inmates in that dangerous situation where the Plaintiff was severely injured. 
Utah Correctional Industries relies on Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah App 1989) 
in support of its claims that governmental immunity has not been waived in this case. The 
factual circumstances in Kirk are dramatically different from the circumstances in Mr. 
Richards' injury. In Kirk, a court bailiff was injured when an inmate in the custody and 
control of the prison being transported to court obtained a gun and shot plaintiff, Mr. Kirk. 
The court in Kirk applied prior rulings of this court that the retention of immunity provision 
includes a situation where the injury is caused by an incarcerated person under the control 
of the state or where the person cannot be released without some kind of permission. See for 
example Madsen v. State. 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) and Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1 483 
P.2d 1296 (1971). The court ruled that the inmate was under the care, custody, and control 
of the State of Utah during his transportation and therefore the immunity would apply or else 
under the circumstances of that case, he had escaped their control and was acting on his own 
therefore the prison owed no specific duty to Mr. Kirk under those circumstances. 
The negligence of Utah Correctional Industries in this case is not based on any alleged 
failure to confine or control a person in their custody. Rather, the claim is that they operated 
a vocational training program outside of the prison facilities under circumstances when the 
participating inmates were neither confined nor controlled or in the custody of the Utah 
Correctional Industries. Mr. Richards' Complaint alleges that Utah Correctional Industries 
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operated a program using participants who were not confined or "incarcerated" at the time 
of Mr. Richards' injury, but in a manner that created a dangerous situation because of Utah 
Correctional Industries' failure to properly supervise or train the participants in the 
vocational training program. In other words, when Utah Correctional Industries engages in 
a profit-oriented enterprise to provide a vocational training program, outside prison facilities, 
it owes the participants the duty to train and supervise the program participants so as not to 
create an unreasonable risk of harm to the individuals participating in the program. The trial 
court erroneously ruled that the injury to Mr. Richards ''arose out o f or "in connection with" 
his incarceration in the Utah State Prison. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF UNDER THE U.S. AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
The Court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief under the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article L Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution. As explained above, to dismiss Mr. Richards' Complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court must have determined that viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and indulging all reasonable inferences 
in the Plaintiffs favor, there was nonetheless no set of facts that could be proven to support 
the Plaintiffs claims. See Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); 
Mounteer v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Under this standard, 
the Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief should not have been dismissed. 
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A. Mr. Richards' Claims are Recognized Direct Actions Based on Violations 
of Self-Executing Constitutional Provisions. 
Mr. Richards may pursue his constitutional tort claims as a direct action. Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution are both self-executing provisions. Bottv.DeLand, 922 P.2d 732,737-38 (Utah 
1996). These provisions do more than simply state general principles, they prohibit specific 
evils that may be defined and remedied without implementing legislation. Courts have held 
that a plaintiff may recover monetar}/ damages for violations arising from similar 
constitutional provisions. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1470-71 
(1980) (allowing a prisoner's mother to recover damages from prison officials for violating 
her son's Eighth Amendment rights); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971) (allowing recovery for damages directly under the Fourth 
Amendment); Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533 
(Utah 2000). 
Utah courts have recognized that an individual may bring a claim for damages arising 
out of a constitutional tort if the constitutional violation arises from a self-executing clause 
of the Utah or United States Constitution. See Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996); 
Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist.. 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971); Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14 (1980). The court in Spackman recognized that in 
Bott v. DeLand, the Utah Supreme Court held that prisoners may collect damages for 
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violations of the unnecessary rigor or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution The couit in Spackman identified that if a constitutional 
provision is self-executing, no implementing legislation is necessary in order to bring a direct 
action foi violation of that constitutional provision The Utah Supreme Court has pre\ lously 
determined that Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution is just such a self-executing 
constitutional provision SeeBottv DeLand The court in Spackman then identified a thiee 
part test to determine whether monetary damages are available for violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision such as Article I, Section 9 The court identified a three 
part test including 
First, a plaintiff must establish that he oi she suffered a "flagrant" \ lolation of 
his or her constitutional rights Second, a plaintiff must establish that her 
existing remedies do not rediess his oi her injuries Third, a plaintiff must 
establish that equitable rebel, such as an injunction, was and is wholl) 
inadequate to protect the plaintiffs lights oi redress his or her mjuiies 
Spackman at 438, 439 
The allegation of John Richards' Complaint heiein meet all of the cntena identified 
m Spackman for a claim of damages for violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution and violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
i. Equitable relief is inadequate to redress John Richards' injuries, 
John Richards received serious and permanent injuries including the amputation of 
one leg and significant injuries to his other leg Equitable relief, such as injunctive relief, 
could not redress the injury received by Mr Richards No equitable remedy can be fashioned 
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that would undue the loss of Mr. Richards' leg. Monetary damages is the only way to 
adequately redress the injury received by Mr. Richards for violation of his constitutional 
rights. 
ii. Existing remedies do not redress Mr. Richards5 injuries 
In the event that the Court determines that Utah Correctional Industries was engaged 
in a core governmental function at the time Mr. Richards was injured or that Mr. Richards' 
injuries arise out of or in connection with his incarceration in prison so that Utah 
Correctional Industries is immune from the negligence claims asserted by Mr. Richards, Mr. 
Richards would not have available to him any remedy to redress his injuries. The court in 
Spademan recognized that in the event that there are other meaningful safeguards and 
remedies available to a claimants who asserts a claim for damages arising out of a 
constitutional violation that the court will not recognize a damage claim for violation of those 
constitutional rights. For example, in Spademan the court refers to the case of Bona v. City 
of Santa Ana, 45 Cal. App4th 1465, 53 Cal.Rptr. 2d 671, where the California court refused 
to create a damage remedy for due process violations where there was an alternative common 
law tort cause of action available to the claimant. Spademan went on to describe that the 
second requirement is meant to insure that court's use their common law remedial power 
cautiously and in favor of existing remedies. In the event that the court determines that Utah 
Correctional Industries is not immune from suit for the negligence claims of Mr. Richards 
then Mr. Richards would have an existing available remedy and there would be no need to 
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impose damages for the constitutional violations suffered by Mr. Richards. Otherwise, if 
Utah Correctional Industries is immune from the negligence claims brought by Mr. Richards, 
then Mr. Richards would have no other existing remedy available to him for the 
constitutional violations. 
Utah Correctional Industries argues that federal courts have not recognized the 
common law cause of action against the states by citizens directly under the federal 
constitution. Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1987). The Thomas court indeed 
explains that "where a plaintiff states a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that 
statute is the exclusive remedy." Thomas at 499 (emphasis added). John Richards, however, 
has not brought a claim under § 1983, and cannot bring a claim against Utah correctional 
Industries under § 1983, therefore, § 1983 is not John Richards' exclusive remedy. In fact, 
as Utah Correctional Industries points out, a § 1983 claim cannot be brought against it. It 
would be a futile exercise to suggest that the John Richards be required to bring his claim 
against the State under § 1983, only to then have it thrown out. As the court explained in 
Owens v. Swan, 962 F. Supp 1436 "it has been uniformly held that plaintiffs may not assert 
a cause of action directly under the constitution, where the statutory remedy of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 is available to themr 962 F.Supp 1436, 1439 (D.Utah 1987) (emphasis added). This 
means only that, where § 1983 provides a remedy, then the Plaintiff may not assert a cause 
of action directly under the Constitution. In our case, however, § 1983 does not provide a 
remedy because the State of Utah is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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The Thomas court explains that before Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 
658 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), "municipalities" were not "persons" under § 1983 and, like 
"states" could not be sued under § 1983. Thomas at 499. Monell however, changed things 
by making it possible for Plaintiffs to sue municipalities under § 1983 by making 
municipalities "persons" under § 1983. Because of this, the Thomas court held that "it is 
unnecessary and needlessly redundant to imply a cause of action arising directly under the 
constitution where congress has already provided a statutory remedy of equal effectiveness 
through which the Plaintiff could have vindicated her constitutional rights." kL at 500. Only 
because of this background and the fact lhat the plaintiff in Thomas actually had a remedy 
under § 1983, did the court conclude that § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for constitutional 
claims brought by the plaintiff against the city official. "We conclude that the precedents 
cited above do not preclude us from holding that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for 
constitutional claims brought by the plaintiff in this case against the city official." Thomas, 
818F.2dat503. 
Mr. Richards does not have 42 USC § 1983 as a remedy available to him against 
Defendant, a direct claim under the constitution is neither unnecessary nor redundant. Since 
no remedy is otherwise available to Mr. Richards, the Court should do what the Supreme 
Court did in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
US 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court found it necessary to create a direct cause of 
action under the constitution because § 1983 does not provide a remedy for constitutional 
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violations committed by federal officers acting under federal laws, or in our case for 
constitutional violations by States. Thomas makes clear that before municipalities were 
brought within the meaning of "persons" under § 1983, the courts allowed direct actions for 
constitutional violations against municipalities, just as the court should allow a direct action 
by Mr. Richards against Utah Correctional Industries. 
iii. Mr. Richards suffered a "flagrant" violation of his constitutional 
rights 
Spackman described the first requirement for allowing a damage claim for 
constitutional violations as follows: 
In essence this means that a defendant must have clearly established 
constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would have known 
to be considered clearly established, "the contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right . . ." The requirement that the unconstitutional 
conduct be "flagrant" insures that a government employee is allowed the 
ordinary "human frailties of forgetfulness, distractability, or misjudgment 
without rendering him [him or herjself liable for a constitutional violation." 
Spackman at 538 (citations omitted). 
The court in Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, discussed these standards under which a 
prisoner may recover damages under Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution stating that 
the prisoner must "show[s] that his injury was caused by a prison employee who acted with 
deliberate indifference or inflicted unnecessary abuse on him." Bott at 790. The court went 
on to describe that "the deliberate indifference standard differentiates between inadvertent 
misconduct, which does not give rise to liability under Article I, Section 9 and unnecessary 
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or wanton infliction of pain, which does give rise to liability." For instance, the court 
recognized that a prison physician would be liable under the deliberate indifference standard 
for choosing an "easier and less efficacious treatment than professional judgment dictates. 
. . Likewise, prison guards would be liable for intentionally denying or delaying access to 
medication or treatment." Bott at 740. 
The allegations of John Richards' Complaint allege more than simply inadvertence 
or mistake. Rather, the allegations of the Complaint allege wanton disregard for the safety 
of participants in the vocational training program. As set forth above, Utah law clearly 
establishes standards for individuals operating heavy commercial machinery and for the 
conduct of commercial driver training programs within the State of Utah. The Utah 
Correctional Industries ignored all of the risks and dangers associated with placing inmates 
in a work environment unsupervised, untrained, and working with heavy equipment and 
machinery. The conduct of Utah Correctional Industries demonstrates their deliberate 
indifference to the safety of the participants in the vocational training program. The 
Complaint of John Richards sufficiently pleads a violation of his constitutional rights and he 
is entitled to bring the action for damages of those self-executing constitutional provisions. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing Mr Richards' Complaint against Utah Correctional 
Industries Wherefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the trial court's 
Ordei ot Dismissal and remand the case foi further proceedings 
DATED and SIGNED this J ? day of April, 2002 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P C 
Robert L Jeffs 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum 
is included herewith 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
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counts I and III of Plf's complaint is granted, c/o deft atty to 
prepare an order for the court to sign. 
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